There is much debate about the origins of human altruism. Does altruistic behavior depend on the internalization of social norms or does it reflect a biological predisposition? What psychological processes for altruism are unique to humans and what are shared with other animals? To address these questions, the authors review evidence on the development of helping and sharing as two basic altruistic behaviors that emerge in early childhood. In addition, they summarize comparative studies with chimpanzees that aim to investigate which aspects are unique to humans versus shared with our closest evolutionary relatives. Finally, they integrate these two lines of evidence to reflect on the evolutionary and developmental processes that build the foundation of altruistic behaviors in humans. They authors argue that during childhood, human-specific socialization processes such as the internalization of norms build upon biologically evolved altruistic tendencies that we share with chimpanzees.
Introduction
Human beings regularly perform acts that benefit others with no obvious external incentive or personal gain for themselves. One school of thought is that humans are basically selfish creatures, and these altruistic acts derive from conformity to prosocial norms (whose breach elicits negative attitudes or even punishment from others). Another school of thought is that humans have a biological predisposition for altruism that does not originate in social norms (though it is of course affected by them). Research in social psychology and behavioral economics has helped us to understand many aspects of human altruism, but it can help us very little in answering this question of origins: where do human altruistic behaviors come from? Which aspects of these behaviors, if any, reflect a biological predisposition, and which aspects, if any, reflect processes of socialization and the internalization of social norms? Not knowing where these behaviors come from is, in an important sense, not knowing what they are.
Our research has focused on the origins of human altruistic behaviors by studying human children and comparing their behavior to our closest primate relatives. By investigating the development of children, we can assess the psychological capacities with which humans are equipped early in life and elucidate the interplay between biological predispositions and social learning. Further, by studying our closest primate relatives-specifically, chimpanzees and bonobos-we can draw inferences about those aspects of human altruism that may have deep evolutionary roots, before the emergence of human culture, and those aspects that are unique to humans and are thus due to more recent human-specific evolutionary and/or cultural forces.
In this essay, we explore some of the new insights that have emerged from this developmental and comparative research. Specifically, we focus on the proximate (psychological) mechanisms that underlie human altruistic behaviors. Importantly, this psychological perspective does not require that these behaviors align with views of altruism defined in terms of fitness costs and benefits at an evolutionary level of analysis. At the evolutionary level of analysis, helping one's siblings may be a self-serving behavior because it increases one's inclusive fitness (kin PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press -Master Gratis Access; date: 16 July 2014 selection), but the psychological mechanism is that one truly cares for one's siblings' welfare.
Unlike many nonhuman animals, humans do not just act for the benefit of others in a single behavioral domain (such as food sharing), or toward only one set of individuals (such as offspring), or in terms of a fixed behavioral script (such as the sting of a bee). Rather, humans possess psychological processes to perform altruistically motivated behaviors in flexible ways, intervening on behalf of various social partners and in various, including novel, situations. This flexibility makes human altruism special-perhaps unique-at the psychological level. By studying these psychological mechanisms, we can learn more about the factors that enable and constrain certain types of altruistically motivated behaviors and explain to what extent different forms are uniquely human and to what extent they are common primate mechanisms.
The two classes of altruistic behavior we focus on here are helping and sharing. We define helping behaviors as actions in which a recipient is trying but failing to achieve a concrete action-goal, and the altruist intervenes on her behalf as his primary goal. This requires that the helper is able to represent the other person's (unachieved) goal, and has the motivation to act on behalf of that goal, even if it entails some effort and opportunity costs. We define sharing as the sharing of resources. Here the recipient's problem is the lack of some resource, and the altruist's intervention consists in giving up some of his own. Prototypical cases are food sharing or dividing up valuable items among social partners, both of which by definition incur a cost to the sharer. We focus on these two classes of behaviors because they represent prototypical cases of altruism, and because recent empirical studies have enabled us to trace their emergence across early ontogeny and to probe for their existence in our closest evolutionary relatives.
Helping
All organisms must first and foremost look out for their own well-being, or else they will not be passing on many of their genes. And so organisms have their own self-serving goals. Helping is in an important sense parasitic on such self-serving goals; that is to say, the only value of an act of helping is with respect to the self-serving goals of the recipient of that help. Although it is not entirely clear how this works either evolutionarily or ontogenetically, much evidence suggests that humans and their closest primate relatives have as an important goal, at least in some situations, that others achieve their goals.
Helping in Young Children
Children begin to help from very early on in their life, and they do so with impressive flexibility. In an initial study, we presented 18-month-old infants with ten different situations in which an adult was having trouble achieving a goal (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) . For instance, an experimenter may be accidentally dropping clothespins while hanging towels on a line or banging helplessly into a cabinet door with a stack of magazines in his hands or not know how to open a novel box. In these kinds of situations, children displayed spontaneous, unrewarded helping behaviors in a variety of ways (and do not perform the same behaviors in matched control conditions in which no help is needed). Another study showed that even 14-month-old children act helpfully, although at this early age only with cognitively less demanding tasks (such as a person reaching for an object) . In addition to these cases of "instrumental helping," children as young as 12 to 18 months of age help others by providing helpful information. Specifically, when in a study an experimenter's belongings were misplaced and the experimenter was now looking quizzically around, children pointed to the object she was searching (Liszkowski, Carpenter, Striano, & Tomasello, 2006) . Thus, when children begin to point, they use this newly acquired communicative device not only for the straightforward selfish reason to request objects from others (socalled imperative points, aka "Give me that!"), but also to help others find what they are looking for (informative pointing, "There it is!"). Thus, already young children have different ways to intervene helpfully.
Children's emerging social-cognitive capacities enable them to decide when and how to intervene. They can determine whether a given situation does or does not meet a person's goal: children hand over an object when it fell to the ground accidentally, but not when the person discarded it on purpose. Similarly, they open the doors of a cabinet door when the person is helplessly bumping it while trying to put a stack of magazines inside, but do not do so when the person is bumping into it struggling to put the stack on top of the cabinet (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) . Thus, they seem to be able to determine when the doors constitute an obstacle or not, and intervene accordingly. For the case of informative pointing, young children differentiate between a displaced object that the person actually needs for the task at hand and displaced distracter object that is irrelevant. Also, children seem to take into account the other person's knowledge about the situation. For example, when two objects are displaced, children point to the object whose disappearance the protagonist failed to notice over the one she saw vanishing (Liszkowski, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2008) . In another study on instrumental helping, it is reported that children take into account whether the protagonist is knowledgeable or ignorant of the actual location of an object (Buttelmann, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009) . Put simply, when a person is trying to open a box without having witnessed how its content has been moved to another box, children disregard the empty box the protagonist is fiddling around with and open the box that actually contains something. However, when the protagonist has witnessed the transfer, they join him in trying to open the empty box, perhaps thinking that he must have a new goal in mind. Such results would suggest that these young children actually help others with their goals (which they infer based on the other's state of knowledge) and do not blindly assist in completing any concrete action that another person (falsely) pursues. Taken together, these diverse studies confronting subjects with a variety of problem situations highlight the flexibility with which young children can use their social-cognitive skills for altruistic purposes.
Helping behaviors seem to become more flexible over time. Specifically, over the course of the second year of life, children need ever less cues to intervene on the other's behalf. In a study by Svetlova, Nichols, and Brownell (2010) , children from 1.5 to 2.5 years of age were more likely to help in the absence of any communicative cues from the recipient when the person struggled to reach for an out-of-reach object, compared with situations which probably require more inferential steps in how to intervene (a person shivering and thus needing a blanket). Another study showed that starting at 2 years of age, children even help when another person did not realize that a problem had occurred (Warneken, 2013) . Specifically, when an object rolled off a table without the adult noticing, children spontaneously picked it up and returned to the adult (but did not do so in control conditions in which the adult had previously discarded the objects on purpose). Thus, children were able to infer the need for help from situational cues, even in the absence of any concurrent behavioral cues or solicitation from the adult. Taken together, in tasks with more concrete goals such as the out-of-reach situations, children helped without direct communicative cues from the recipient, whereas explicit communication was necessary to elicit helping in the more complex tasks, especially for the younger children. This is also congruent with an experiment in which 14-month-old infants helped in simpler problem situations (a person reaching for objects), but not in more complex tasks such as opening a novel box for the other or holding a cabinet door open . Summarizing across studies, we can thus conclude that soon after their first birthdays, children begin to help others in simple situations such as helping another person gain an out-of-reach object, and become increasingly more sophisticated over the second year of life, being able to infer goals from situational cues and without direct communication from the recipient.
These young children help even when the costs of helping are slightly raised. For instance, children continue to help even if they have to leave a fun activity behind such as playing with a novel toy . As another example, children help over repeated trials even if they have to surmount an array of obstacles, something that can be quite challenging for a toddler who just learned to walk (Warneken, Hare, Melis, Hanus, & Tomasello, 2007) . Children are thus motivated to help even if it involves opportunity costs or effort to do so.
Thus, young children seem eager to help from early on in their lives. But what exactly motivates their helping? One potential explanation is that children themselves are not genuinely motivated to help, but their parents motivate them to do so. Maybe we have been mislead because parents provide subtle cues or because children can feel their parents' eyes on them during the experiment. This is easy to rule out by asking parents to stay out of the room during the experiment. As a matter of fact, results show that toddlers help to the same extent when the parent is absent. Interestingly, when parents request children to help, it does not straightforwardly increase their helping in the situation itself or subsequent trials (Warneken & Tomasello, under review) . Thus, at least in these basic helping situations, children neither need the guidance nor a little nudge from the parents to help.
Another potential candidate is that children help for an immediate benefit such as praise or a tangible reward. Using a crucial distinction from motivational psychology, we may ask whether children's early helping is intrinsically or extrinsically motivated: Do children help because the helpful act itself is inherently rewarding, or only because the helpful act is instrumental in bringing about separate outcomes such as concrete rewards? Results speak in favor of the first alternative. Specifically, studies show that toddlers help without receiving praise from either the parent . Moreover, young children do not seem to be driven by the expectation of a concrete reward: 18-month-old children who were offered a toy as a reward for helping were not more likely to help than children who helped without being given a reward . In this study rewarding was not necessary to elicit helping; nor did it increase the rate of helping over repeated trials. Thus, what determined the child's helping was the other's unfulfilled goal, not an immediate benefit for child.
To investigate the relationship between helping and external incentives more closely, we took advantage of a curious feature of intrinsic motivation: It is a well-established phenomenon that intrinsic rewards can be undermined by salient extrinsic rewards (also called the "overjustification effect") (Deci, 1971; Lepper, Greene, & Nisbett, 1973) . We found that children who had received a material reward for helping during an initial test phase were subsequently less likely to engage in further helping than those children who had not received such a reward , (see also Fabes, Fultz, Eisenberg, May-Plumlee, & Christopher, 1989 for schoolaged children). This rather surprising finding provides even further evidence for the hypothesis that children's helping is driven by an intrinsic rather than an extrinsic motivation. Rewards are often not only superfluous but can have even detrimental effects as they may undermine children's intrinsic altruistic motivation.
What Children's Helping Behaviors Reveal about Human Altruism
Summarizing across studies on children's helping, we thus find evidence for an early emergence of basic altruistic tendencies. What does this reveal about the basis of human altruism? With these results, we can now evaluate certain claims about the factors that give rise to altruistic behaviors in humans. In particular, the fact that these helping behaviors emerge so early in life renders is it implausible that socialization is the main factor accounting for its emergence and clearly refutes certain specific hypotheses about the socialization practices that are necessary. For example, we can rule out the claim that children are initially oblivious to the needs of others and help only when promised concrete rewards (e.g., Cialdini, Kenrick, & Baumann, 1982) , or that humans develop spontaneous helping behaviors only after a long reward history until ultimately helping becomes self-rewarding around adolescence (e.g., Bar-Tal, 1982) . It is also questionable to assume that these young children have already adopted an explicit moral value system that guides their behavior. Moreover, there is no indication that these young children are adept at reputation management, an ability that does not seem to emerge before school age (Banerjee, 2002 (Banerjee, , 2002b . We can thus conclude with confidence that these factors are necessary. On the other hand, it is of course possible that parental reinforcement had shaped these behaviors before they were put to the test. Nevertheless, there are several problems with an approach that relies on external (especially parental) reinforcement alone. First, natural observations of children show that parents do not appear to systematically reinforce altruistic behaviors with tangible rewards, but most of the time just acknowledge the helpful act (Grusec, 1991) . Second, even if rewards occurred, infants 14 to 18 months of age would have had little opportunity to be reinforced for helping. Third, studies with older children show that the inducement of altruistic behaviors through concrete reinforcements does not transfer to other types of situations or interactions with other people-when the incentive disappears, so does the behavior (Moore & Eisenberg, 1984) . The reported studies, in contrast, demonstrate that children also help an unfamiliar adult in novel situations for which they could not possibly have been rewarded in the past. Fourth, as described above, external rewards can have negative effects on helping in an experimental situation. This is corroborated by a longitudinal observational study in which the amount of parental reinforcement of compliant altruistic behavior was negatively correlated with behaviors toward a peer 2 years later (Eisenberg, Wolchik, Goldberg, & Engel, 1992) . Given these data, it seems rather implausible to assume that young children are initially totally self-focused and oblivious to the needs of other, with socialization practices completely re-programming children's motivations. Nevertheless, it is still possible that there are certain socialization practices early in life that have not been captured in previous studies. Perhaps children are particularly adept social learners when it comes to helping behaviors, or perhaps adults are particularly motivated to raise altruistic offspring. More to the point, children may learn to help because they imitate other people's helping behaviors. Unfortunately, no studies with infants and toddlers directly addressed this topic. However, indirect evidence comes from a very different source: studies of chimpanzees. If socialization practices such as teaching helpful behavior or internalizing social norms are a necessary prerequisite for the emergence of the kinds of altruistic behaviors we see in young children, we would not expect to find them in chimpanzees. That is because although chimpanzees show flexible social-cognitive skills (Michael Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and may transmit some cultural information about some domains of life such as tool use (Whiten, McGuigan, Marshall-Pescini, & Hopper, 2009) , there is currently no indication that chimpanzees transmit cultural norms about appropriate social behavior or actively reward their offspring for social behaviors toward others. Thus, studies with chimpanzees can inform us whether these types of socialization factors are actually necessary for helping behaviors to emerge.
Helping in Chimpanzees and Bonobos
Studies on altruistic behaviors in nonhuman great apes have yielded mixed results. On the one hand are experiments in which chimpanzees do not seize the opportunity to act on behalf of others, even it comes at no or minimal additional cost. In particular, chimpanzees do not reliably deliver food to a conspecific by pulling a board within reach of them (Jensen, Call, & Tomasello, 2007) and do not choose a mutualistic over a selfish outcome in a forced-choice situation (Silk, Altmann, & Alberts, 2006) . On the other hand, a series of studies show that under some circumstances chimpanzees help others in ways that are not so different from what we find in human children. It thus seems important to try to explain both the presence and absence of certain types of altruistic behaviors in chimpanzees. A close examination of the proximate (psychological) mechanisms for altruism will move us closer to an answer to this question. Chimpanzees might possess cognitive and motivational traits that facilitate certain types of altruistic behavior not too dissimilar from what we find in humans, while at the same time being somewhat different in other regards. Again, we have to look at a variety of behaviors to gain a comprehensive picture.
Chimpanzees engage in instrumental helping behaviors, and do so with some flexibility. In an initial study, we tested human-reared chimpanzees in the same tasks as the 18-month-old children described above and found that they would also help their caregiver when she was reaching for out-of-reach objects (Warneken & Tomasello, 2006) . They did so spontaneously without being offered a reward (and they did not do so in the control condition, in which she was not reaching for them). However, in contrast to the out-of-reach tasks, these chimpanzees did not help reliably in the other types of tasks (opening a door for the other; using different means to open the novel box for the other, etc.). Perhaps importantly, this discrepancy in chimpanzees' willingness to help in different types of tasks parallels a finding with 14-month-old human infants, whose helping was also limited to the tasks involving out-of-reach objects . The most likely explanation for this is that individuals failed to help in these situations not because they necessarily lacked the motivation to help, but because they put higher demands on their social cognition. These human-raised chimpanzees were in principle willing to help, but showed this behavior only in contexts in which the other's goal was easy to identify.
Instrumental helping is not restricted to human-raised chimpanzees who interact with their human surrogate mother: a second study with semi-free ranging chimpanzees indicated that they would help a human stranger with whom they had no prior interaction when he was reaching for objects . Perhaps most surprisingly, as with children, the apes were equally likely to help when the human was offering a reward (here, a piece of food) as when he did not offer a reward. Chimpanzees were thus motivated to help the experimenter with his unachieved goal, and not by the possibility of retrieving a concrete reward for themselves. This helping tendency was sustained when helping was made more effortful in that chimpanzees had to climb into a raceway to retrieve the object for the experimenter. Again, chimpanzees helped even though they did not receive a reward. Thus, chimpanzees are willing to help even in the absence of a concrete reward and when helping is energetically costly.
Last but not least, chimpanzees help each other. In one experiment, one chimpanzee (the recipient) was faced with the problem that a door leading to a room with a piece of food was fixed with a chain that she could not unlock . But if another chimpanzee (the actor) released this chain from an adjacent room, the recipient would be able to enter. Results showed that chimpanzees often released the chain to let the other chimpanzees enter (and did so significantly more often than in various controls in which opening the door would not help the conspecific or no conspecific was present). This finding shows that subjects were attentive to the recipient's goal, intervening on the recipient's behalf when she was unsuccessfully trying to open the door. We can thus conclude that when the problem is made salient, chimpanzees help conspecifics gain access to food in a novel situation. In a related study, Yamamoto and colleagues showed that chimpanzees passed a tool to another individual who needed it to retrieve food. Importantly, this helping occurred almost exclusively in situations in which PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press -Master Gratis Access; date: 16 July 2014 they previously observed the conspecific attempting to reach for the tool (Yamamoto, Humle, & Tanaka, 2009 ). Chimpanzees virtually never handed over the tool proactively in the absence of such a cue eliciting altruistic behaviors. This is in line with the previous studies in which the chimpanzees were able to signal their need for help by, for example, reaching for an object or unsuccessfully opening a door. This thus indicates that perhaps the cues provided by the recipient are facilitative or even necessary to elicit helping behaviors.
This possibility was studied most systematically in an experiment by Melis and colleagues (2010) , in a setup in which the chimpanzee subject could release a bag containing a reward so that it would slide down a chute toward a conspecific. Chimpanzees performed this behavior more often when the recipient was either actively trying to access the reward (by pulling a rope, which in some conditions was attached to the bag) or communicated with the subject. They were less likely to help when the recipient remained passive. In addition, Melis and colleagues manipulated whether the reward was a piece of food or a token that the recipient could later exchange for food, testing the hypothesis that the presence and necessity to actively provision food might impede helping (the role of food is an issue we will return to later). This study revealed that the tendency to help was not diminished with food rewards (compared with tokens). Rather, the main factor that predicted helping was again the activity of the recipient, either in the form of manipulating the apparatus or communicating to the subject. It is perhaps important to note that these soliciting and problem-solving behaviors should not be confused with harassment (Gilby, 2006) , as physical contact between helper and recipient was never possible and chimpanzees did not show any threat displays.
What Chimpanzee Helping Reveals About Human Altruism
Summarizing across studies, we see that chimpanzees show some flexibility in helping, performing this behavior in various experimental contexts, which differ in the type of problem and the corresponding type of intervention. This includes novel situations in which helper and recipient have not encountered in this form before. Chimpanzees do not help in all these contexts, probably because the problem is not always salient to them, and thus most of the time the recipient has to signal the need for help for the helper to get into action. Chimpanzees are willing to pay some costs for helping, as they continue to help over repeated trials even when helping is somewhat effortful. And they do not expect to receive an immediate concrete reward, as they help equally when they are offered a reward for helping than when they are not. Thus, chimpanzees thus appear to have the basic cognitive skills and the motivation to on occasion act on behalf of others in instrumental helping situations.
The presence of basic instrumental helping behavior in chimpanzees provides further evidence for a biological predisposition of human altruism. Specifically, the fact that chimpanzees lack the socialization practices and cultural norms purported to explain the emergence of altruism in humans, but still show basic altruistic tendencies, negates the notion of socialization as the primary factor of human altruism. These results thus nicely complement our conclusions drawn from the evidence of an early emergence in human ontogeny. Moreover, the presence of these behaviors in chimpanzees hints at deep evolutionary roots. These basic altruistic processes might thus potentially date back at least to the last common ancestor of humans and chimpanzees. To complete the picture about the last common ancestor, it would be imperative to know whether bonobos, as the sister-species of chimpanzees and equally closely related relative of humans, perform instrumental helping behaviors as well. We are not aware of any published experiments that have addressed this. Nevertheless, what we can conclude based upon the available data is that socialization practices and cultural norms do not seem to be necessary for the emergence of the basic instrumental helping behaviors that we find in human children. Unless these traits have emerged twice independently in the last couple of million years, rather than being shared by our last common ancestor, we can conclude that the basic skills for helping have evolutionary roots which pre-date the onset of human culture.
Sharing
By many definitions, altruism requires some kind of sacrifice on the part of the altruist. Instrumental helping requires in many cases-and certainly most of those that have been studied experimentally-relatively little sacrifice on the part of the helper. In most experiments, all that is required of the helper is to expend a little energy and to forgo some relatively unexciting opportunities. And thus we turn to sharing, which, per our definition, requires that the altruist sacrifice resources under her control which she might otherwise keep for herself. These resources may of PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press -Master Gratis Access; date: 16 July 2014 course vary in their value, but much experimental research has concerned food, arguably the most fundamental resource.
Sharing in Young Children
Sharing of resources can be regarded as perhaps the prototypical form of altruistic behavior. By definition, it involves an immediate cost, as one person is giving up a valuable resource that benefits another individual. Correspondingly, sharing of resources (especially food) is perhaps the most studied form of altruism among anthropologists, behavioral economists, or biologists studying animals. Despite the importance of this behavior, surprisingly few systematic studies have been conducted with young children, which invites the question: To what extent are young children able to detect that other individuals are lacking a resource and are willing to share with them-even if doing so involves a cost to the donor?
One of the few studies investigating this question is an experiment by Brownell and colleagues, which indicates that 2-year-old children begin to take into account another person's need when they have the opportunity to share with others (Brownell, Svetlova, & Nichols, 2009 ). Specifically, toddlers were confronted with an apparatus offering the choice to either pull one rope which would deliver a snack to themselves and a snack to an adult bystander (1:1 option) or to pull another rope that would also bring a snack to the child, but no snack to the bystander (1:0 option) (task adapted from Silk et al., 2005) . Thus, the children could provide food to the bystander at no additional cost to them (in terms of either resources or effort). Interestingly, whereas 18-month-old children chose randomly, 25-month-old children more often chose the 1:1 option benefiting both themselves and the bystander simultaneously. Notably, they did so only in a condition in which the bystander had verbalized her desire for the food, indicating that young children require explicit cues to note the other's person need in this context. This shows the importance of cues provided by the recipient to elicit sharing not dissimilar to what we have observed in the domain of instrumental helping. This is also the conclusion from a study by Dunfield and colleagues, in which 18-and 24-month-old children performed costly sharing acts by giving some of their own food to an adult who expressed a desire by making a sad face and requesting sharing with a palm-up gesture (Dunfield, Kuhlmeier, O'Connell, & Kelley, 2010) . In addition to explicit verbal communication and gestures, young children's sharing is sometimes also the response to people's affective displays. Specifically, in one study with 1.5-to 2-year-old toddlers, an experimenter (the victim) was sad over having lost her balloon, on which several of the toddlers offered one (or sometimes both) of the two balloons that they had in their possession (Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2009 ). Interestingly, this sharing behavior was not only influenced by the other person's affect in the sharing situations itself, but also by a prior incident: Children were slightly more likely to help if the victim had previously been mistreated by another "evil" experimenter. Specifically, children who had witnessed the destruction of the victim's belongings and shown signs of concern were more likely to share and comfort the victim in the balloon situation. This indicates that children's sympathy with the plight of another person can mediate children's sharing. Summarizing across studies, we see that different behaviors can elicit sharing in young children. At least for early sharing behaviors, the recipient's need has to be fairly explicit, but very different cues might suffice, including verbal or gestural communication or the person's affective display.
Beyond these face-to-face situations, studies have traced the emergence of children's sharing with absent others as well (for an overview, see Gummerum, Hanoch, & Keller, 2008) . For example, in Moore (2009) , even though the recipient was not present during the test, 4-to 5-year-old children chose an option with equal rewards for oneself and another child over a selfish option with a higher payoff to oneself-at least when the recipient was a friend. Several studies show that toward school age, costly sharing becomes more common, and also occurs in situations in which children have the choice to share with anonymous others. Specifically, studies using the Dictator Game (in which the subject divides up a resource between oneself and another individual), show that children's tendency to give at least something increases continuously over development between 3 and 9 years of age (Blake & Rand, 2010) . Moreover, these experiments with actual resources (and thus potentially costly behavior), as well as studies using hypothetical situations, converge on the finding that between 5 and 7 years of age, children most often share according to equality (Blake & Rand, 2010; Damon, 1977; Fehr, Bernhard, & Rockenbach, 2008; Graziano, Musser, Rosen, & Shaffer, 1982; Hook & Cook, 1979) . "advantageous inequity aversion." Specifically, in a study by Blake and McAuliffe (2011) , children from 4 to 8 years of age could decide to either accept or reject certain potential resource allocations. If they accepted, resources would be distributed between themselves and a peer as suggested. If they rejected, no one would get anything. Children of all age groups rejected allocations that were disadvantageous to them (1 for self: 4 for other), but accepted equal offers (1:1). This is consistent with another study in which starting at 4-years of age, children reject unequal offers in an Ultimatum Game, and thus respond to mostly disadvantageous inequality (Takagishi, Kameshima, Schug, Koizumi, & Yamagishi, 2010) . However, whereas all younger children accepted the reverse distributions that would benefit them (4:1), 8-year-olds frequently rejected these allocations as well (and always accepted 1:1 distributions). Thus, these 8-year-old children often chose to destroy a resource over receiving more than the other child. Children sacrifice a personal gain to prevent inequality. Taken together, these new studies adapting paradigms from behavioral economics, as well as earlier studies on distributive justice reasoning (Hook & Cook, 1979) show that a tendency to share resources equally emerges over childhood, with equality being the most dominant strategy at children entering school age.
These studies have typically used windfall situations in which children divide up a resource that is just given to them. But what does resource-sharing look like when children have to work to obtain the resource in the first place? Specifically, in a recent set of experiments, we tested the idea that collaboration should elicit higher rates of equal sharing than when children work individually or do not have to work at all to gain a resource. This is because for collaboration to function reliably, partners should operate on the implicit agreement that those who are committed to the collaborative goal of obtaining a resource should be rewarded in kind. Studies show that after collaboration, 3-year-old peers mostly share resources equally most of the time (Warneken, Lohse, Melis, & Tomasello, 2011) and even distinguish whether the reward was the outcome of joint, individual, or no work: In a study by Hamann, Warneken, Greenberg, and Tomasello (2011) peers manipulated a problem-solving apparatus to retrieve toys, where during certain trials the "lucky" child suddenly ended up with three toys and the "unlucky" child with only one toy. Results showed that the "lucky" child was more likely to share the surplus toys with the "unlucky" child after they had worked together (collaboration condition) than when both had worked individually (parallel condition) or the rewards were just in front of them (windfall). Thus, children were more likely to rectify the situation and produce equal outcomes after collaboration than both after individual work or a windfall gain. This shows that equality begins to play a role quite early in development, facilitated by collaborative situations in which children work toward a common resource.
Taken together, from early on in their ontogeny, children begin to share resources with others. Resource sharing is not as prevalent as instrumental helping, most likely due to the costs inherent in sharing. However, at least for younger children the opportunity to share resources might often not be as salient as the opportunity to help in instrumental problem situations. Specifically, for young children to engage in sharing, it appears critical that the recipient is present to make her desire or problem explicit. However, during middle childhood, children begin to share resources also with absent individuals. When children reach school age, this culminates in a sense of equality-something they uphold even if it entails self-sacrifice. The developmental origins of this sense of equality are not yet understood, but the fact that collaboration elicits equal sharing in children as young as 3 years of age indicates that perhaps mutualistic collaboration may lay the foundation for equality.
Sharing in Chimpanzees and Bonobos
Chimpanzees appear to be quite limited in their tendency to share monopolizable resources. For example, a series of studies by colleagues (2006a, 2006b ) used an experimental problem-solving tasks in which chimpanzees can only succeed if they both simultaneously pull ends of a rope to move a board with food within their reach (apparatus from Hirata & Fuwa, 2007) . Strikingly, chimpanzees mostly failed when the food was clumped as a pile in the middle of the board, making it easy for the more dominant individual to monopolize everything. They only succeeded when the rewards were spread apart so that each individual was able to access their portion without potential interference from the other chimpanzee (Melis et al., 2006a; 2006b) . In addition to the spatial layout of the rewards, successful collaboration was highly dependent upon the degree of social tolerance between the partners: the only dyads who cooperated successfully on this mutualistic task were those who had in pretests co-fed peacefully over a food resource rather than trying to monopolize it (Melis et al., 2006b ). Thus, social tolerance appears to be an important constraining factor for chimpanzee cooperation. Naturalistic observations have shown that when sharing occurs in chimpanzees, it predominately consists of passive sharing. That is, the possessor lets the other individual take some of the resource, rather than actively transferring it to the other (Boesch & Boesch, 1989) . Namely, meat sharing after cooperative hunts occur mainly in response to harassment (Gilby, 2006) in which the possessor lets another individual have part of the bait (the "sharing under pressure hypothesis" Wrangham, 1975) . Although immediately costly, this sharing behavior is probably not due to generosity, but because sharing parts of the carcass is less costly than trying to defend it. Concretely, possessors might be better off letting some of the resource go than risking to get into a fight with the harasser and potentially losing the carcass altogether. Passive sharing is also the most prominent mode of transfer in social constellations that are less dire than male hunting parties. Specifically, in mother-infant pairs, infantinitiated food transfers in which the infant attempts to take food and the mother tolerates it are more common than mother-initiated food transfers (Ueno & Matsuzawa, 2004) . Moreover, mother-initiated food transfers observed in this study occurred exclusively with less desirable parts of the fruits such as seeds and husks. Overall then, chimpanzees have a strong tendency to monopolize resources that they rarely give up voluntarily. This tendency can sometimes even prevent them from mutualistic gains and has thus been hypothesized to be a major constraint for the emergence of collaboration more generally.
Importantly, the most active meat sharing in the wild occurs between individuals who are coalition partners and therefore reliably help one another in fights in other contexts (Muller & Mitani, 2005) . Further, chimpanzees almost never share plant foods in the wild, but when they have raided human crops, sometimes males share food with reproductively cycling females, presumably in hopes of sex (Hockings et al., 2007) . In captivity, de Waal and Luttrell (1988) found that chimpanzees who share food with others are more often groomed by them in return later. Brosnan and de Waal (2002) have argued that this "market activity" is very likely not calculated reciprocity in which individuals keep quantitative track of favors given and received with specific other individuals. More likely, it is a kind of "attitudinal reciprocity" in which individual chimpanzees have more positive affect toward those who have helped them or shared with them in the past, thus leading to a reciprocal pattern of helping and sharing.
Bonobos present an interesting contrast with chimpanzees. Although bonobos belong to the same genus as chimpanzees (genus Pan) and their phylogenetic pathways split only about 2 million years ago, they seem quite different in some respects than chimpanzees. This seems especially true for their behaviors around food resources. Namely, bonobos are generally more socially tolerant over food than are chimpanzees, as indexed by their greater tendency to co-feed side by side without individuals trying to monopolize a resource (Wobber et al., 2010) . This has consequences for their ability to collaborate for monopolizable resource. Specifically, when bonobos were tested in the same collaborative board-pulling task as the chimpanzees, the location of the food as either clumped in the middle or spread apart in two locations did not matter for their success at the task. In contrast to chimpanzees, who mainly succeeded when the rewards were spread apart, bonobos succeeded also in the clumped version (Hare, Melis, Woods, Hastings, & Wrangham, 2007) . Thus, probably because there was no expectation of competition over the spoils at the end, it was of less importance whether the rewards were easily monopolizable.
Bonobos even actively enable other individuals to access food that they have in their possession. Specifically, in one experimental setup one bonobo subject was feeding on a resource while another individual was located in an adjacent "waiting room" behind a locked door. Strikingly, subjects often voluntarily removed a peg that was blocking the door similar to a bolt, and thus allowing the other bonobo to enter the room and take some of the food. It is not entirely clear from this study whether bonobos actually intended for the other to have food or whether an urge for unobstructed social and sexual play took precedence over feeding. It is nevertheless striking that these bonobos were willing to sacrifice some of their food even though inaction would have easily allowed them to keep all for themselves. In summary, although experimental data is currently sparse, due to their overall greater social tolerance and reduced aggression, bonobos appear to be more likely to engage in sharing behaviors than are chimpanzees, at the very least in their tendency to co-feed even when resources are monopolizable.
Beyond studies in which subjects could monopolize rewards, several experiments indicated that chimpanzees are often reluctant to deliver resources to others even if it would come at no additional cost to the actor. Specifically, in Silk et al., (2005) , chimpanzees chose randomly when they had the option to deliver a food-piece to themselves and another food piece to a conspecific (1:1: mutualistic option) or an option that would deliver food only to themselves (1:0: selfish option). Similar results were obtained by Yamamoto and Tanaka (2010) in a modified version with a button-pressing mechanism that would deliver the same payoffs. Results showed that chimpanzees PRINTED FROM OXFORD HANDBOOKS ONLINE (www.oxfordhandbooks.com). (c) Oxford University Press, 2014. All Rights Reserved. Under the terms of the licence agreement, an individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a title in Oxford Handbooks Online for personal use (for details see Privacy Policy). Subscriber: Oxford University Press -Master Gratis Access; date: 16 July 2014 preferred the 1:1 option, but did not differentiate between situations in which a partner was in the other room to retrieve the additional item or the room was empty. Moreover, in a structurally similar study by Horner et al. (2011) , chimpanzees preferred the 1:1 over the 1:0 option and now differentiated between a recipient present vs. absent condition, although the absent condition was always presented last and direct statistical comparisons are thus problematic). Similar conclusions have been drawn by Jensen, Hare, Call, and Tomasello (2006) , chimpanzees did not act altruistically even when doing so would only have required pulling a rope that moved an otherwise unobtainable board with a piece of food toward another conspecific (see Vonk et al., 2008 , for variations on this food-provision paradigm leading to similar results). Thus, these studies indicate that chimpanzees are not particularly inclined to actively share resources with others-even if this would come at no additional cost to themselves.
What might explain the positive findings from studies on instrumental helping in chimpanzees on the one hand and the negative findings on (noncostly) food sharing on the other? One potential methodological reason might be that in studies using the food-deliver paradigms mentioned above, the recipients typically did not signal any need for intervention. Specifically, chimpanzees did not reach for food or communicatively signaled their need, but passively waited for the other to act (see Jensen et al., 2007) . In these tests, the other individual's need might not be as salient as it is salient in instrumental helping situation. Moreover, in some of the tests this might have been exacerbated by the fact that the subject was in the act of foraging for herself while at the same time paying attention to the potential payoff to the other.
The study by Melis et al. (2010) -which we already summarized under the heading of instrumental helping-is informative in this regard. In this experiment, chimpanzee subjects could release a chain, causing an attached transparent bag to slide down a ramp to within reach of a recipient who was positioned on the other side of the ramp. The bag either contained a piece of food or a token that could be exchanged for food. A transparent panel prevented the subject from pulling the bag toward her, thus removing the temptation to keep everything to oneself. Interestingly, chimpanzees frequently released the bag, with the critical factor eliciting this behavior being whether the recipient was either actively trying to get it (e.g., by in some conditions pulling a rope that was attached to the bag), or was communicatively signaling the need for intervention when no such rope was available. Chimpanzees were more likely to show this behavior when the recipient was active compared with both situations in which the recipient was passive or absent altogether. This finding thus provides further evidence for the claim that signaling is important to elicit altruistically motivated behaviors in chimpanzees. Several of the food delivery paradigms do not evoke this behavior to the same extent that instrumental helping paradigms do.
Another potential explanation for the discrepancy in findings was that chimpanzees did not help in some of the experiments because it required them to actively provide food. As we have seen, chimpanzees are highly competitive over food, and this might put chimpanzees in a different mind-set during the experiment, which obstructs any altruistic tendency even when the subject is not able to get hold of the food reward. However, in Melis et al. (2010) , chimpanzees were equally likely to release the bag for the other when it contained food. Thus, the presence of food per se does not interfere with helping-at least when the problem is made salient.
Overall then, it seems like chimpanzees are sometimes willing to act on behalf of others, although with major constraints. The other's need has to be very salient and sometimes the recipient has to directly communicate with the helper to elicit prosocial behavior. Strikingly, although chimpanzees help and even make food available, this tendency seems to collapse when they could obtain the food for themselves. The constraints on food sharing are not only apparent in altruism situations, they even extend to situations in which chimpanzees could benefit mutually through collaboration.
The Scope of Altruistic Behaviors in Humans and Other Great Apes
Helping and sharing occur to some degree in humans' closest primate relatives, chimpanzees and bonobos, and they emerge early in human ontogeny. This suggests an evolutionary basis for these behaviors in human beings. But the human versions of helping and sharing are much more robust and flexible and occur in a much wider range of situations and behavioral domains than those of the other great apes. What explains this difference in scope?
On the evolutionary level, the "Interdependence Hypothesis" suggests that humans have evolved to live a much more cooperative lifestyle than have the other apes (Tomasello, Melis, Tennie, Wyman, & Herrmann, 2012 Specifically, whereas other great apes forage mostly individually-they travel in small groups but each individual procures and consumes food on its own-humans have evolved as collaborative foragers. Prototypically, several individuals hunt or gather together and divide the spoils at the end in mutually satisfactory ways (or even bring it back to a home base to share it with the entire social group). The closest thing in other great apes is chimpanzees' group hunting of monkeys, but that behavior can be understood as each individual attempting to capture the monkey on its own, and indeed, as noted above, the sharing of the spoils is mostly based on begging and harassing (Gilby, 2006; Tomasello et al., 2005) .
The basic idea is that as collaboration became ever more obligate for human foragers (due to some ecological change), humans individuals became more interdependent with one another. This is obvious during the collaborative foraging itself. If any one individual is having trouble with her role, it is in the direct interests of the others to help her-because her role is essential to our joint success. Indeed, modern day hunter-gatherers do all kinds of things to help one another during the foraging itself, from loaning weapons to others to clearing paths for others to carrying others' children (Hill, 2002) . But individuals who are sensitive to the future also find it in their interest to help others outside the foraging context, since they might be needed as collaborative partners for tomorrow's foraging party. Interdependence breeds altruism. (Again note that although this scenario posits an evolutionary advantage for those who help their partners, the individual's psychological motivation is a genuine concern for the welfare of others-especially those from within her group.)
In addition to individuals' direct interest in the well-being of others, collaborative foraging also has an element of partner choice. Thus, if an individual forager attempts to hog all the spoils of a collaborative hunting venture, or fails to help her partner when he needs it, she may get away with it this time but next time the others will not choose her as a partner but rather leave her out. This is also true of individuals who might want to slack on their job, and even individuals who are not very competent in collaborating with others. This so-called "social selection" process means that poor collaborators who do not share spoils mutually satisfactory ways or help their partners as needed will not have their needed partners in the future, and so will leave fewer offspring in the future.
In this hypothesis, then, humans were both biologically and socially selected for collaboration, helping, and sharing. In a later evolutionary step human groups began competing with one another, and as a result humans' skills and tendencies for collaboration then scaled up to group life as a whole: we all must collaborate in order to compete with those barbarians across the river. There thus arose a kind of group-mindedness in human groups in which individuals had such an interest in other individuals being cooperative that they began not just avoiding poor collaborators but actually punishing them. Group norms arose as the agreed-upon ways that individuals must act in order to keep in the good graces of the rest of the group on whom they depended-and these social norms could of course vary to some degree from group to group. Following social norms thus became another layer, the cultural layer, of motivation for human helping and sharing.
Conclusion and Future Directions
One major goal for future research is to investigate the relationship of children's early prosocial motivations and the cultural norms that children acquire throughout development. Piaget's (1932) classic theory of moral development stressed that young children are subject to the force of moral and other social norms from very early in development. They follow these norms because they respect adults and older children (and perhaps fear punishment from them as well). In this theory it is only later that children become truly moral, as they interact with peers and come to have a concern and respect for other persons as thinking, feeling, and equally deserving human beings. While this view captures something of reality-young children certainly do follow social norms before they fully understand their rationale-the research we have reported here, as well as other research, suggests that young children are much more genuinely moral than Piaget recognized. Young children help and share with others to a large extent based on an intrinsic motivation aimed at the well-being of others. And moreover, they become selective in their helping and sharing quite soon as well. Thus, from early in development young children prefer to help and share with "nice" over "mean" individuals Kenward & Dahl, 2011; Olson & Spelke, 2008; Vaish, Carpenter, & Tomasello, 2010) , and these preferences for recipients of altruism may be based on tendencies toward social evaluation from even earlier in ontogeny (Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007; Kuhlmeier & Boysen, 2001) . understanding the fundamentally prosocial nature of social norms. That is to say, starting at around three years of age, young children not only follow social norms themselves, but they enforce them on others-suggesting that they in some sense understand their underlying prosocial motivations. They enforce both moral norms (Vaish, Missana, & Tomasello, 2011) and merely conventional norms (Rakoczy, Warneken, & Tomasello, 2008) on others -saying things like "No, you shouldn't do that" or "It doesn't work like that"-and they do this in flexible ways depending on context and in-group status (Schmidt, Rakoczy, & Tomasello, 2011) . This enforcement of social norms thus suggests that by three years of age young children understand that they have some kind of stake in others following the rules that they themselves follow; they have become group-minded in seeing that for most things to work, everyone concerned must cooperate.
Human children are biologically predisposed to be cooperative, and, in addition, they grow up in an environment that expects them to be cooperative, rewards them for being cooperative, and also punishes them in one way or another for not being cooperative. Future research should investigate how these factors contribute to the development of children's cooperative behaviors. In our hypothesis, these factors are ontogenetically ordered: children begin with biologically evolved cooperative tendencies (with, of course, individual differences in these) and then various processes of socialization (also with individual differences) work on these. Both natural selection and social selection have worked and do work against individuals who do not help and share with others, which means, conversely, they have worked and are working for individuals who do. Both phylogeny and ontogeny thus conspire to temper humans' natural self-serving impulses with altruistic impulses that enable them to better live in interdependence with others.
